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COMMENTS
case does not appear to have arisen in Louisiana, but there seems
little doubt that the marriage would be held valid.
Daniel 1. Shea
Establishment and Termination of Public Rights
in Roads and Streets in Louisiana
In recent years the problem of determining the ownership
of lands underlying roads and streets has become extremely im-
portant. This is particularly so in the fields of taxation and
mineral rights, where it is necessary to ascertain the person who
must bear the tax responsibilities or is entitled to the benefits
of the revenues produced by the land. The right to explore for
minerals along public roads has often hinged on determining
the ownership of the underlying soil.' In real estate transactions,
problems concerning property owners' rights and liabilities re-
lating to public passageways have frequently been encountered. 2
It is the purpose of this Comment to examine the various legal
methods by which the public use of roads and streets is created
and terminated. It is felt that by this approach the task of de-
termining ownership in these cases can be facilitated and the
rights and liabilities of the parties more clearly determined.
Establishment of Rights in Roads and Streets
The rights acquired by the public in the opening of a road
or street may be based on either ownership or servitude. The
difficulty met by the courts in determining these rights seems
to emanate from an inability to distinguish adequately between
the methods by which ownership is obtained and those by which
a servitude is acquired. In the following discussion an examina-
tion will be made of the six methods by which legal interests in
roads and streets have been established: (1) purchase, (2) ex-
propriation, (3) dedication, (4) three years' maintenance under
R.S. 48:491, (5) appropriation of river roads, and (6) prescrip-
tion. It should be noted that by the first three methods either
ownership or a servitude may be obtained. In the latter three,
however, only a servitude is acquired.
1. State v. Evans, 214 La. 472, 38 So.2d 140 (1948). In that case, the de-
fendants were convicted of unlawfully prospecting for oil, gas, and other minerals
by means of a mechanical device or otherwise on lands which were found to be
private.
2. E.g., Metairie Park, Inc. v. Currie, 168 La. 588, 122 So. 859 (1929).
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Purchase. The right to purchase property for the construc-
tion of public highways is expressly granted to the State Depart-
ment of Highways in Title 48 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes.
Parishes3 and municipalities 4 are granted similar rights. Little
difficulty seems to be encountered in determining the effects to
be given a purchase of a right of way for a road or street. The
governing body or agency may acquire either ownership or a
servitude by this method. The problem apparently resolves it-
self into a question of interpretation of the statute or of the act
of sale to ascertain which interest has been acquired. To be kept
in mind, however, is the rule established in Bonnabel v. Police
Jury, Parish of Jefferson/, that the presumption is, in the ab-
sence of evidence to the contrary, that only a servitude is
granted.
Expropriation. A second method by which a governing body
or agency may obtain rights in land for roads and streets is
through the exercise of its right of expropriation.6 Constitu-
tional authority for the exercise of this right is provided in
article I, section 2, of the Louisiana Constitution. Further basis
for the compulsory sale is found in articles 497 and 2626-2641
of the Civil Code, which provide the authority and procedure for
such action. In addition, Title 19 of the Louisiana Revised Stat-
utes contains many provisions pertaining to this subject and
should also be consulted. As in the case of the ordinary pur-
chase, expropriation" may result in the acquisition of either
ownership or a servitude. The task of determining which right
is obtained is one of interpretation of the statute or Code ar-
ticles under which the right is exercised, or, in disputed cases,
of the judgment of the court.7
Dedication. A third method by which the public may acquire
rights in land for the purpose of opening roads and streets is
through dedication of the land to that use by a private individual
or corporation. This dedication may be according to a statutory
scheme or implied from the conduct of the landowner.8 The
3. LA. R.S. 48:481 et 8eq. (1950).
4. Id. 33:3301 et aeq.
5. 216 La. 798, 44 So.2d 872 (1950).
6. For detailed commentary on expropriation in Louisiana by Arthur B. Ham-
mond of the Baton Rouge Bar, see 14 WEST'S LOUISIANA REVISED STATUTES
ANNOTATED 475-98 (1950).
7. Knox v. Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co., 157 La. 602, 102 So. 685 (1925).
8. B. F. Trappey's Sons v. City of New Iberia, 225 La. 466, 73 So.2d 423
(1954) ; Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. v. Parker Oil Co., 190 La. 957, 1&3 So. 229
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difficulties in this area are in distinguishing between the two
types of dedication and in determining the results of each. As
a general rule, statutory dedication conveys title to the parish
or municipality while implied or common law dedication, 9 on the
other hand, grants only a servitude of passage. 10
The basis for statutory dedication is R.S. 33:5051,11 which
outlines the procedure to be followed by a property owner de-
siring to create a subdivision in a municipality or parish. In
order to create a subdivision, the statute provides that a land-
owner must file a map with the Registrar of Conveyances of
the parish, describing the lots, streets, alleyways, and other
places, together wtih the names and dimensions of each. The
owner is also obliged to make a formal dedication of the passages
designated on the map. Courts have been very liberal in applying
(1938) ; Collins v. Zander, 61 So.2d 897 (La. App. 1952), 25 TUL. L. REV. 88
(1950).
9. The term "common law" is used to signify that the principle is part of the
customary or non-statutory law of the state, rather than borrowed from the Anglo-
American system of common law.
10. James v. Delery, 211 La. 306, 29 So.2d 858 (1947) ; Arkansas-Louisiana
Gas Co. v. Parker Oil Co., 190 La. 957, 183 So. 229 (1938) ; Collins v. Zander,
61 So.2d 897 (La. App. 1952) ; Brasseaux v. Ducote, 6 So.2d 769 (La. App.
1942) ; Life v. Griffith, 197 So. 646 (La. App. 1940).
11. LA. R.S. 33:5051 (1950) : "Whenever the owner of any real estate desires
to lay off the same into squares and lots with streets or alleys between the squares
or lots and with the intention of selling or offering for sale any of the squares
or lots, he shall, before selling any square or lot or portion of the same, cause the
real estate to be surveyed and platted or subdivided by a licensed surveyor or civil
engineer into lots or blocks or both, each designated by number, and set stakes
at all of the corners of every lot and block thereof, properly marked so as to
designate the correct number of each lot and block; write the legal description of
the land on the plat or map, and cause to be made and filed in the office of the
keeper of notarial records of the parish wherein the property is situated and
copied into the conveyance record book of such parish, and a duplicate thereof
filed with the assessor of the parish a correct map of the real estate so divided,
which map shall contain the following:
"(1) The section, township, and range in which such real estate or subdivision
thereof lies according to government survey.
"(2) The number of squares by numerals from 1 up, and the dimensions of
each square in feet and inches.
"(3) The number of each lot or subdivision of a square and its dimensions in
feet and inches.
"(4) The name of each street and alley and its length and width in feet and
inches.
"(5) The name or number of each square or plat dedicated to public use.
"(6) A certificate of the parish surveyor or any other licensed surveyor or civil
engineer of this state approving said map and stating that the same is in accord-
ance with the provisions of this Section and with the laws and ordinances of the
parish in which the property is situated.
"(7) A formal dedication made by the owner or owners of the property or
their duly authorized agent of all the streets, alleys and public squares or plats
shown on the map to public use." See also LA. R.S. 33:31 (1950).
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the statute and have held that substantial compliance is all that
is necessary to complete a statutory dedication.12
The leading case on the subject of statutory dedication is
Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. v. Parker Oil Co.'s In that case
the court stated, first, that a dedication in compliance with the
statute is complete in itself and does not require an acceptance,
and, second, that by statutory dedication the public authority
acquires not a servitude, but complete ownership of the soil
underlying the streets and other designated passages. A more
recent case in which the same conclusion was reached is Collins
v. Zander.1 4 There, the court of appeal stressed that no ac-
ceptance is necessary by declaring that "the dedication becomes
complete immediately upon the recordation of the plan or map
and substantial compliance with Act 134 of 1896."' 1
Although the Parker Oil case dealt specifically with statutory
dedication, it has also been cited as establishing the principles
of common law dedication.16 The court announced in that case
that a distinguishing difference between statutory and common
law dedication is that the latter operates by way of an estoppel
in pais while the former operates by way of a grant. Also, com-
mon law dedication confers only a servitude, 17 while statutory
dedication vests title in the public authority to which the dedica-
tion is made. The essential elements of a common law dedication
are a definite intention to dedicate and an acceptance by the
public. While neither of these elements must be formally ex-
pressed, they must both be demonstrated so as to exclude any
12. Metairie Park v. Currie, 168 La. 588, 122 So. 859 (1929) (formal dedi-
cation requirement not complied with) ; Collins v. Zander, 61 So.2d 897 (La. App.
1952) ; Life v. Griffith, 197 So. 646 (La. App. 1940) ; Sliman v. Village of Pal-
metto, 145 So. 410 (La. App. 1933) (plat filed in the office of the keeper of no-
tarial records but not copied into the conveyance record book).
13. 190 La. 957, 183 So. 229 (1938).
14. 61 So.2d 897 (La. App. 1952).
15. Id. at 899.
16. Emery v. Orleans Levee Board, 207 La. 386, 21 So.2d 418 (1945) ; Ford
v. Shreveport, 204 La. 618, 16 So.2d 127 (1943) ; Collins v. Zander, 61 So.2d 897
(La. App. 1952); Brasseaux v. Ducote, 6 So.2d 769 (La. App. 1942); Life v.
Griffith, 197 So. 646 (La. App. 1940) ; Comment, 13 TUL. L. REV. 606 (1939)
Note, 25 TUL. L. REV. 88 (1950).
17. It has been suggested that rural roads should be distinguished from city
streets in that dedication of land for road purposes vests a servitude in the public,
while dedication for purposes of a city street vests ownership in the public. The
jurisprudence affords no support for such a distinction, which would seem to create
additional confusion, e.g., what would be the effect upon the ownership of a road
bed which is included in a town's extension of its corporate limits? See Flory,
Who Gets the Royalty on Unit Production Allocated to Streets and Public Roads?,
THIRD ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON MINERAL LAW 51 (1955).
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other rational hypothesis except that of dedication.' 8  The ac-
ceptance must be positive and for the purposes intended by the
landowner; however, it has been held that the mere use by the
public for the purposes intended is sufficient. 19 It seems that
common law dedication is in reality only an expression by the
landowner, through words or conduct, that he intends to grant
to the public a servitude of passage, coupled with an acceptance
by the public.
It should be noted that the courts have not always followed
the views announced in the Parker Oil case concerning common
law dedication. Prior to that decision, a majority of the cases
stated that land dedicated to public use became a public thing,
out of commerce and not susceptible of private ownership. 20 The
governing authority within whose limits the dedicated land was
situated was given control of the land and had the power to ad-
minister it as a public trust.21 These principles still seem to be
applicable where land is dedicated for use other than as a road
or street.
22
Three years' maintenance under R.S. 48:491. In addition to
the possible acquisition of a servitude of passage by implied
dedication, a servitude may also be acquired through the main-
18. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. v. Parker Oil Co., 190 La. 957, 183 So. 229(1938) ; Landry v. Gulf States Utilities Co., 166 La. 1069, 118 So. 142 (1928) ;
Donaldson's Heirs v. New Orleans, 166 La. 1059, 118 So. 134 (1927) ; Bomar v.
Baton Rouge, 162 La. 342, 110 So. 497 (1926) ; New Orleans v. Carrollton Land
Co., 131 La. 1092, 60 So. 695 (1913) ; Torres v. Falgoust, 37 La. Ann. 497 (1885) ;
Heirs of David v. New Orleans, 16 La. Ann. 404 (1862) ; Soulet v. New Orleans,
10 La. Ann. 81 (1855) ; Brasseaux v. Ducote, 6 So.2d 769 (La. App. 1942) ; Kemp
v. Town of Independence, 156 So. 56 (La. App. 1934).
19. Ford v. Shreveport, 204 La. 618, 16 So.2d 127 (1943) ; Bomar v. Baton
Rouge, 162 La. 342, 110 So. 497 (1926) ; Heirs of Leonard v. Baton Rouge, 39 La.
Ann. 275, 4 So. 241 (1887) ; Police Jury of Plaquemines Parish v. Foulhouze, 30
La. Ann. 64 (1878); Shreveport v. Walpole, 22 La. Ann. 526 (1870); Baton
Rouge v. Bird, 21 La. Ann. 244 (1869); Pickett v. Brown, 18 La. Ann. 560
(1866) ; Brasseaux v. Ducote, 6 So.2d 769 (La. App. 1942).
20. New Orleans v. Carrollton Land Co., 131 La. 1092, 60 So. 695 (1913)
Kline v. Parish of Ascension, 33 La. Ann. 562 (1881),; Police Jury of Plaquemines
Parish v. Foulhouze, 30 La. Ann. 64 (1878) ; Sheen v. Stothart, 29 La. Ann. 630
(1877) ; Shreveport v. Walpole, 22 La. Ann. 526 (1870) ; Baton Rouge v. Bird,
21 La. Ann. 244 (1869) ; Municipality No. Two v. Orleans Cotton Press, 18 La.
122 (1841); Livaudais v. Municipality No. Two, 16 La. 509 (1840) ; Kemp v.
Town of Independence, 156 So. 56 (La. App. 1934) ; Town of Napoleonville v.
Boudreaux, 142 So. 874 (La. App. 1932).
21. New Orleans v. Carrollton Land Co., 131 La. 1092, 60 So. 695 (1913)
Tilton v. New Orleans City R.R., 35 La. Ann. 1062 (1883) ; Kemp v. Town of
Independence, 156 So. 56 (La. App. 1934).
22. See Locke v. Lester, 78 So.2d 14 (1955), 16 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 582(1956), concerning the dedication of land used as a public cemetery; Macobon,
Inc. v. Police Jury of Jefferson Parish, 70 So.2d 687 (La. App. 1954), where a
plot of ground was alleged to have been dedicated as a public park.
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tenance or repair by a parish or municipality of a road or street
for a period in excess of three years. The Legislature has pro-
vided in R.S. 48:49123 that "all roads and streets.., which have
been or are hereafter kept up, maintained or worked for three
years by authority of any parish governing authority in its par-
ish or by authority of any municipal governing authority in its
municipality shall be public roads or streets as the case may be."
Part of the original act,24 providing for an arbitrary measure
of compensation for deprivation of the land, was declared un-
constitutional in Gibbon v. Police Jury of Parish of St. Mary,25
but the remainder of the provisions are still applicable.
The statute has received interpretation in the recent case of
Porter v. Huckabay.26 In that case the defendant landowner
maintained three gates across the road in question and repaired
the road through the use of private funds. He did not, how-
ever, object to extensive repairs made by parish authorities. The
court stated that the gates were only an indication that the
owner intended to keep the road private and although this
would defeat the public acquisition of a servitude by implied
dedication, it would not prevent the application of R.S. 48:491.
It was pointed out that the statute does not require an intention
to dedicate and that it is sufficient if the parish authorities
work the road for the required period without protest by the
landowner. On the other hand, in Bordelon v. Heard2 7 the court
held that an occasional "brushing up" of a pathway by public
workmen was not "working or maintaining" within the mean-
ing of the statute.
23. LA. R.S. 48:491 (1950) : "All roads or streets in this state that are opened,
laid out or appointed by virtue of any act of the legislature or by virtue of an
order of any parish governing authority in any parish, or any municipal govern-
ing authority in any municipality, or which have been or are hereafter kept up,
maintained or worked for a period of three years by authority of any parish gov-
erning authority in its municipality shall be public roads or streets as the case
may be. Also all roads or streets made on the front of their respective tracts of
lands by individuals when the lands have their front on any of the rivers or
bayous within this state shall be public roads when located outside of municipal-
ities and shall be public streets when located inside of municipalities." As amended,
La. Acts 1954, No. 639, § 1, p. 1150.
24. La. Acts 1914, No. 220, p. 417, which provided that: [I]t shall be lawful
for any individual through whose land the police jury shall cause a public road to
be laid out, to claim a compensation of double the assessed value of the said land."
25. 140 La. 854, 74 So. 172 (1916).
26. 50 So.2d 684 (La. App. 1951).
27. 33 So.2d 88 (La. App. 1947) ; see The Work of the Louisiana Supreme
Court for the 1951-1952 Term - Civil Law Property, 13 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw
230, 231 (1953).
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Other cases have further interpreted the statute. It has been
consistently held that the statute does not provide a method by
which police juries or municipalities may obtain title to the land
needed for public road purposes, but only a method by which a
servitude of passage may be acquired.28 Naked ownership re-
mains in the landowner who acquiesced in the maintenance of
the property." A grant in writing is not required to create the
servitude, nor is a resolution by the governing body declaring
the road to be public necessary.30 For R.S. 48:491 to be ap-
plicable, however, the maintenance or repair of the road or street
by the governing authority must be done peacefully and without
coercion. 31
Appropriation of river roads.32 Article 665 of the Civil
Code 33 provides for the appropriation of a servitude upon a
''space to be left for public use by the adjacent proprietors on the
shores of navigable rivers, and for the making and repairing of
levees, roads and other public or common works." The constitu-
tionality of this provision was sustained by the United States
Supreme Court in Eldridge v. Trezevant, which held that "the
subject-matter of such rights and regulations falls within the
control of the States, and the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States are satis-
fied if ... the State law, with its benefits and obligations, is im-
partially administered." 34
Very little difficulty has been encountered in the administra-
tion of this provision, although several problems are worthy of
mention. It should be noted that article 665 grants only a servi-
tude, ownership remaining in the riparian owner. 35 In most
28. Paret v. Louisiana Highway Commission, 178 La. 454, 151 So. 768 (1933) ;
Fuselier v. Police Jury, 109 La. 551, 33 So. 597 (1903) ; Bradley v. Pharr, 45 La.
Ann. 426, 12 So. 618, 19 L.R.A. 647 (1893).
29. Goree v. Midstates Oil Corp., 205 La. 988, 18 So.2d 591 (1944).
30. Fontenot v. Veillon, 72 So.2d 587 (La. App. 1954).
31. Elliot v. Police Jury of Evangeline Parish, 132 So. 368 (La. App. 1931).
32. A brief history of the riparian servitude of passage shows that its origin
is European and goes back to the Romans. It had its birth in the necessity of a
towage path along the banks of floatable water courses. By the time of the settle-
ment of Louisiana the servitude had grown into a royal road and was much wider
than the original towage path.
33. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 665 (1870): "Servitudes imposed for the public or
common utility, relate to the space which is to be left for the public use by the
adjacent proprietors on the shores of navigable rivers, and for the making and
repairing of levees, roads and other public or common works ......
34. 160 U.S. 452, 468 (1896).
35. Landry v. Gulf States Utilities Co., 166 La. 1069, 118 So. 142 (1928).
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cases involving river roads the plaintiff landowner seeks dam-
ages for what he claims is an expropriation of his property. This
argument was satisfactorily answered in Peart v. Meeker, 6
where the court held that in the application of article 665 the
state does not "expropriate" property but lawfully "appropri-
ates" it for a use to which it is subject under a condition implied
in the owner's title. An appropriation is an exercise of the police
power, and any loss does not entitle the injured party to recom-
pense, the same being damnum absque injuria.3 7 Expropriation
is an exertion of the right of the public to possess itself, by com-
pulsory sale, of lands within the state, the resulting damages
being compensable.38
Concerning the extent to which the riparian owner's property
is subject to the servitude, the article has been interpreted so as
to limit its applicability to purposes incidental to the use of the
stream. An interesting case on this point is Hebert v. T. L.
James & CoA9 in which the plaintiff sought to prevent the de-
fendant from widening a thirty-foot road into a seventy-five-
foot highway. In upholding the plaintiff's injunction, the court
stated that the servitude imposed by law on property bordering
a navigable stream was not intended to serve the public for any
purpose other than that which is incidental to the nature, navi-
gability, or use of the stream. In another case it was indicated
that to use the land for other than riparian purposes would con-
stitute a taking of private property without compensation and
would be violative of the United States and Louisiana Constitu-
tions.40
For article 665 to be applicable, it is first necessary to estab-
lish that the river or stream in question is navigable. It is well
settled that if the waterway is or was once navigable, the ad-
jacent land is subject to the servitude in favor of the public. 41
To be navigable, a river or stream must be susceptible of being
used in its natural state as a highway for commerce, over which
trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes
of trade and travel over water.42 Once the test of navigability is
36. 45 La. Ann. 421, 12 So. 490 (1893).
37. Ruch v. New Orleans, 43 La. Ann. 275, 9 So. 473 (1891).
38. Ibid.
39. 224 La. 498, 70 So.2d 102 (1953).
40. Village of Moreauville v. Boyer, 138 La. 1070, 71 So. 187 (1916).
41. Wemple v. Eastham, 150 La. 247, 90 So. 637 (1922).
42. McGilura v. Ross, 215 U.S. 70 (1909) (lakes in the State of Washington)
State v. Aucoin, 206 La. 787, 20 So.2d 136 (1944) (Lake Long in Lafourche
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satisfied, the public is entitled to the use of a road or street along
the stream, the width of which is to be determined by the gov-
erning authorities according to their discretion, 43 as limited, how-
ever, by the restriction in the Hebert case.
Prescription.44 In Louisiana a servitude of passage is dis-
continuous and therefore not susceptible of acquisitive prescrip-
tion.4 5 This is so even if the passage is evidenced by structures
that are apparent and of a permanent nature.46 An exception to
this rule, however, is provided in article 765 of the Civil Code.
It states that the public may acquire a servitude of passage "by
the open and public possession and use of a road for the space
of ten years, after the said road or servitude has been declared
a public highway by the Police Jury, provided such servitude so
acquired shall not extend beyond the width of forty feet." This
article has received little application in the jurisprudence. In
Bomar v. Baton Rouge47 the Supreme Court declared in dictum
that the provisions of article 765 have no application to streets
or roads within a municipality. In Town of Ruston v. Adams4 8
this dictum was cited as authority for the proposition that a
town cannot acquire land for a street by prescription. The ap-
plicability of article 765 was denied in Landry v. Gulf States
Utilities Co.49 with the statement that the prescription provided
for by that article will begin to run only from the time when the
road has been declared a public highway by the police jury. Al-
though the statute authorizes acquisition of a passage forty feet
in width, the Attorney General has ruled that prescription will
Parish); State v. Jefferson Island Salt Mining Co., 183 La. 304, 163 So. 145
(1935) (Lake Peigneur in Iberia Parish) ; State v. Sweet Lake Land & Oil Co.,
164 La. 240, 113 So. 833 (1927) (Sweet Lake in Cameron Parish) ; Delta Duck
Club v. Barrios, 135 La. 357, 65 So. 489 (1914) (Cubitt's Gap in Plaquemines
Parish); Goodwill v. Police Jury, 38 La. Ann. 752 (1886) (Mack's Bayou in
Bossier Parish).
43. Village of Moreauville v. Boyer, 138 La. 1070, 71 So. 187 (1916).
44. For a complete discussion, see Schoenrich, Acquisition of Rights of WaV
by Prescription, 12 TuL. L. REV. 226 (1938).
45. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 722 (1870) : "Servitudes are either continuous or dis-
continuous.
"... Discontinuous servitudes are such as need the act of man to be exercised.
"Such are rights of passage, of drawing water, pasture and the like."
LA. CIVL CODE art. 766 (1870) : "Continuous nonapparent servitudes, and dis-
continuous servitudes, whether apparent or not, can be established only by title.
"Immemorial possession itself is not sufficient to acquire them ... " See Com-
ment, 15 LouiSIANA LAW REvIEw 777 (1955).
46. Ogborn v. Lower Terrebonne Refining & Mfg. Co., 129 La. 379, 56 So. 323
(1911) ; Torres v. Falgoust, 37 La. Ann. 497 (1885).
47. 162 La. 342, 110 So. 497 (1926).
48. 9 La. App. 618 (1929).
49. 166 La. 1069, 118 So. 142 (1928).
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run only as regards the amount of land actually used by the pub-
lic, if less than forty feet..
Termination of Rights in Roads and Streets
It frequently becomes necessary to determine the ownership
of property after a road or street is no longer used by the public.
In this respect the problem in most instances will resolve itself
into a question of whether the public owned the land initially or
possessed merely a servitude of way. It will also be necessary
to determine whether or not the public has actually ceased to use
the right of way. Where the public has only a servitude of pas-
sage the owner of the land retains title to the land throughout
the existence of the servitude. Termination of the servitude
merely results in restoration of full ownership. The problem is
quite different, however, where title to the land was vested in the
governing body when the right of way was created.
In the main, rights of way are extinguished in two ways: (1)
abandonment of the ownership or servitude, and (2) termina-
tion of a servitude by ten years' non-use. The remainder of this
Comment is devoted to a discussion of these two methods.
Abandonment. Roads or streets may be abandoned by the
public by one of two modes: (a) by a formal act of revocation
and setting aside of a dedication in accordance with R.S.
48:701 ;51 or (b) by an informal revocation evidenced by the clear
and well-established proof of an intention to abandon the road
on the part of the governing body. Title to the land underlying
roads or streets can be relinquished only by the first method.
The abandonment of a servitude of passage may be implied by
many and varying circumstances or simply by a declaration by
the governing authorities that the servitude has been abandoned.
Intention to abandon has been established by the relocation of
the road or street under the authority of the governing body of
the municipality or parish and the maintenance by that body of
the relocated road.5 2 It should be noted, however, that R.S.
50. Ops. LA. ATT'Y GEN. 428 (1938-40).
51. LA. R.S. 48:701 (1950) : "The parish governing authorities and municipal
corporations of the state, except the parish of Orleans, may revoke and set aside
the dedication of all roads, streets, and alleyways laid out and dedicated to public
use within their respective limits, when the roads, streets, and alleyways have
been abandoned or are no longer needed for public purposes.
"Upon such revocation, all of the soil covered by and embraced in the roads,
streets, or alleyways up to the center line thereof, shall revert to the then present
owner or owners of the land contiguous thereto .. "
52. Starnes v. Police Jury of Rapides Parish, 27 So.2d 134 (La. App. 1946).
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48:701, applying to formal abandonment, can have no application
to the abandonment of a servitude," because, under that statute,
title to the property under the roads or streets up to the center
line vests in the contiguous landowners upon abandonment. To
apply the statute to abandonment of a servitude might consti-
tute a deprivation of property without due process of law.
An important case on the subject of formal abandonment is
State ex rel. Young v. Hickman.5 4 There the court of appeal
ruled that it is within the discretion of the municipal authorities
whether a dedication shall be set aside when a street has been
abandoned or is no longer of use to the public. It indicated that
a presumption arises that the action of the authorities in aban-
doning a street is proper, which presumption can be rebutted by
contrary allegations. This proposition was affirmed by the Su-
preme Court in Caz-Perk Realty, Inc. v. Police Jury of Parish of
East Baton Rouge5 5 where the court declared an injunction
against enforcement of an ordinance revoking a dedication and
closing the street to be an unwarranted interference with the
police jury's discretion. The court indicated, however, that a
municipality should not take such action without first conducting
an investigation of the situation and providing property owners
with a proper hearing to voice their objection. In Jeffries v.
Police Jury of Rapides Parish5 6 it was reiterated that the courts
will not interfere with the police jury's discretionary power to
declare a road abandoned unless the action of that body was
fraudulent, capricious or arbitrary. In Bordelon v. Heard5 7 it
was pointed out that action by an individual member of the police
jury in declaring a road abandoned would not suffice, and that
the abandonment must be authorized by the.police jury as a body.
The effect to be given an abandonment under R.S. 48:701
was clearly established in the case of Arkansas-Louisiana Gas
Co. v. Parker Oil Co.58 In that case the plaintiff's lessor had sub-
divided a tract of land into squares, lots and streets in substan-
tial compliance with act 134 of 1896 (R.S. 33:5051). The sub-
division was never developed and some years later the police
jury of Caddo Parish abandoned the tract of land in accordance
53. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. v. Parker Oil Co., 190 La. 957, 183 So. 229
(1988).
54. 13 La. App. 173, 127 So. 659 (La. App. 1930).
58. 190 ha. 957, 183 So. 229 (1938).
55. 207 La. 796, 22 So,2d 121 (1945).
56. 53 So.2d 157 (La. App. 1951).
57. 33 So.2d 88 (La. App. 1947).
58. 190 La. 957, 183 So. 229 (1938).
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with R.S. 48:701. Defendant subsequently obtained a lease from
an adjacent landowner, which lease included the land under-
lying the street in question. When defendant began drilling op-
erations, plaintiff sued claiming that the revocation vested full
title to the beds of the streets in its lessor, thus entitling it to
the right to develop the property. The court, however, applied
R.S. 48:701 and held that defendant was entitled to develop the
property underlying the street "up to the center line thereof."
R.S. 48:701 received further interpretation in Martin v.
Fuller.5 9 In that case a lease had been entered into prior to the
recording of a revocation of a dedication of streets adjacent to
the leased property. Under the terms of the lease the lessee was
granted the option to purchase the property, but this option was
not exercised until after the recording of the revocation. The
court held that, because transactions relative to immovable prop-
erty must be recorded, 60 a statutory abandonment would not af-
fect the rights of third parties until recorded. Consequently, the
unrecorded revocation provided no notice to the parties, and
when the lessee exercised the option to purchase the land he ac-
quired a portion of the road.
Proof of abandonment was considered in the case of Starnes
v. Police Jury of Rapides Parish."' There, a new road had been
established after a bridge on the old road had been washed out.
The plaintiff brought suit claiming that he was entitled to re-
sume ownership and use of the land underlying the old road,
since the establishment of the new road constituted an abandon-
ment. The court, however, pointed out that there had been no
formal abandonment of the road, that the relocation had been
done in a haphazard fashion and without the authority of the
police jury, and that there had been no evidence presented which
indicated an intention on the part of the police jury to abandon
the road. By so holding the court confused formal and informal
abandonment. Although the decision may be questioned for this
reason, the case is of value in that it indicates that an informal
abandonment requires unequivocal evidence of an intention to
abandon. Earlier, in a 1927 case, Lecour v. Lecour,6 2 the court of
59. 214 La. 404, 37 So.2d 851 (1948) ; see Note, 23 TUL. L. REv. 402 (1949) ;
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Property, 10 LOuISIANA LAW REVIEW 176 (1950).
60. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2264, 2266 (1870).
61. 27 So.2d 134 (La. App. 1946).
62. 6 La. App. 360 (1927).
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appeal stated that "the owner of the soil on which a public road
shall pass may resume and take possession of the same 'when-
ever said road shall have been abandoned by the public, or shall
have been transferred elsewhere with the consent of the owner
and with that of the competent authority.' "63 The court based
its decision on a portion of section 3368 of the Revised Statutes
of 1870, which was not carried into the Revised Statutes of
1950. Although there is no statutory provision today which au-
thorizes implied abandonment, the courts, as with implied dedi-
cation, continue to recognize this method of abandonment.
Termination of servitude of passage by ten years' non-use. A
second method by which the public may lose a servitude of pas-
sage or way is through liberative prescription of ten years, as
expressed in article 789 of the Civil Code.6 4 Although the Louisi-
ana Constitution states that "prescription shall not run against
the State in any civil matter,"65 it was declared in New Orleans
v. Salmen Brick & Lumber Co.66 that this constitutional provision
does not prevent prescription from running against a parish or
municipality where the subject involved is alienable. This prin-
ciple is well established in the jurisprudence. Thus, in Baret v.
Louisiana Highway Commission 7 the police jury of Calcasieu
Parish had obtained a servitude on additional ten-foot strips of
land on the sides of an old road. The court held that non-usage
of the strips of land for more than ten years extinguished the
right to their use. Similarly, in Jouett v. Keeney,65 the grantee
of a servitude of passage was ruled to have lost the rights and
privileges over the strip by non-usage during the prescribed
period.
Thomas D. Hardeman
The Degree of Cruelty Necessary to Justify Separation
from Bed and Board in Louisiana
Article 138(3) of the Louisiana Civil Code provides that if
one spouse is guilty of such cruel treatment toward the other as
to "render their living together insupportable" the other spouse
63. Id. at 362.
64. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 789 ,(1870) : "A right to servitude is extinguished by
the non-usage of the same during ten years."
65. LA. CONST. art. XIX, § 16.
66. 135 La. 828,-66 So. 237 (1914).
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